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Book: America's Great Depression :: Robert Kiyosaki|Books :: Book
Date: Thursday, 08 January, 2009 :: 11:59
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America's Great Depression
List Price: USD $90.00
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Manufacturer: Blackstone Audiobooks, Inc.
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Editorial Review: Product Description
This staple of modern economic literature explains how the American Great Depression was not a crisis for capitalism but merely a downturn in the business cycle, generated by government intervention in the economy.
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Average Customer Review: 
1 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
Summary: Eye-Opening after some dry preparation
Date: 2008-12-29 -
Comment: The first 100 pages or so of this book are tough-going with Rothbard confining himself to economic theory which makes for dry reading. Eventually, this gives way to actual history in which Rothbard convincingly demonstrates that not only wasn't Hoover a laissez-faire capitalist as we've been commonly taught, but he pushed for policies that Roosevelt in turn simply pushed further to their logical statist conclusion. Many of the programs Hoover supported will sound ominously familiar to readers of today's headlines and hopefully readers will recognize that many of the fixes that are being proposed today were tried then and failed. Rothbard convincingly explains why. I would have given this five stars, but the first 100 pages almost had me giving up on the book which would have been a shame.
2 of 2 people found the following review helpful:
Summary: Clairvoyant Economics
Date: 2008-10-16 - 
Comment: In his 1982 introduction to the third edition, Rothbard wrote: "A Democratic administration may be expected to inflate with even more enthusiasm (than the Reagan administration was then engaged in doing). We can look forward, therefore, not precisely to a 1929-type depression, but to an inflationary depression of massive proportions." Although premature in this prognosis, the state of the economy in October 2008 makes Rothbard's remark sound prescient. Anyone wondering whether or not the economic rescue plan of Congress and the Bush administration, or those of the two main presidential candidates, can cure the current depression must read Rothbard's analysis of the 1929 version.
Certainly the current depression vindicates Rothbard of the charges against him (as well as against Ludwig von Mises and the entire Austrian-school of economics) leveled by Amazon critic Jack L. Rutner. Mr. Rutner purports to be an economist himself, yet demonstrates in his review that he fails to comprehend the methodology of economics. Every one of the charges Rutner makes against Rothbard, von Mises and the Austrian school were considered and incisively refuted by von Mises in a 150-page, 1962 essay entitled, which is also available from Amazon (The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science: An Essay on Method). Rutner obviously suffers from a weakness described by von Mises therein: "The epistemologist who starts his lucubrations from the analysis of the methods of the natural sciences and whom blinkers prevent from perceiving anything beyond this field tells us merely that the natural sciences are the natural sciences and that what is not natural science is not natural science. About the sciences of human action he does not know anything, and therefore all that he utters is of no consequence."
2 of 3 people found the following review helpful:
Summary: Truer today than it was 40 years ago
Date: 2008-07-25 -
Comment: We all understand that particular industries and markets may go through hard times at one point or another. But what causes an entire economy to flourish, only to contract at a later date? What causes the entire economy to misread the economic signs? What causes the entire economy to misforecast and make bad investments? What causes a "Cluster of Errors"?
It is hard to believe that anyone could casually discount Rothbard's analysis of the business cycle and the Great Depression given America's current struggle with a depressed housing market caused by the villian that Rothbard goes to great lengths to describe: Credit Expansion.
The fact that this book was written 40 years ago, and that it is just as applicable to today's market as it is to the market in 1929, adds to the intellectual weight and veracity of this work.
This is not a historical narrative, this is a book on economics. It first explains Ludwig Von Mises theory concerning boom-bust business cycles as they are caused by loose Federal monetary policy and loose lending by banks. It then delves into the history of the Great Depression, applying the theory to the history. In terms of readability, I found the book very easy to read and very compelling. In terms of economic analysis I found Rothbard's arguments in favor of Mise's theories regarding the business cycle to be very thorough and convincing.
The Austrian School of Economics is not mainstream. Rothbard is not Friedman, and he is not Keynes. It is unfortunate that some reviewers were hoping to read an echo-chamber for Lord Keynes or Milton Friedman, and seemed to rate Rothbard based on how close Rothbard's theories and conclusions were to the theories and conclusions of their favorite economist.
It is also unfortunate that some of the reviewers were not expecting an economic analysis, but their false expectations should not reflect poorly on the author or his work.
2 of 4 people found the following review helpful:
Summary: The Real Deal on the New Deal
Date: 2008-05-29 -
Comment: If we are talking about collectivist government privileges interfering with the sound functioning of a prosperous economy, Rothbard knows we can't start researching the Great Depression with Roosevelt's response to an economic collapse. Rather, there's not much to be said about him in this book.
Rather we look to some pretty non-traditional trends in government power. We go before WWI and the ensuing debt, and the resulting advantages in the world economy. Rothbard even goes into a history of America's previous depressions, which we don't hear about, and were all treated with an increased laissez-faire attitude. So we aren't given a "The Great Depression changed everything" theory of unsound economics, just like in foreign policy "9/11 changed everything". In the 1900's, we get a slew of "progressive" government interference with markets. This is not only the FED, but the income tax (reaching 79% in the middle of the depression), union privilege, increased government spending, removing domestic links between the dollar and gold, "protectionist" tariff hikes, price controls, and eventually a mix of fascism and socialism.
Part of what Democrats don't like to hear is that Roosevelt was personally complemented by Hitler and Mussolini on his fascist economic system. Eventually America would "solve" its depression the same way Italy and Germany did - nationalism for war and increased military spending.
But part of what Republican's don't like to hear is that Hoover started the New Deal, which Rothbard shows is what prevents the economy from recovering as it did in all previous depressions. Hoover supported wage controls in a deflating economy, forcing unemployment, which many people believe WAS the defining characteristic of the depression. Others believe it was the stock market crash. But any quick glance at the changes of money supply shows why prices had to do what they did. In an environment of artificially loose credit created by expanding the money supply, the ability to pay loans and make profitable loans, or even any long-term fixed rate contract, depends upon prediction of the central figures who determine how loose credit will be. Even a small change at the government and FED level can cause a sizeable bust.
Many hold "speculation" accountable, saying that the rampant gains of capitalism spurred this reckless speculation. Well, what could be more recklessly speculative than a small group of men trying to set a monetary policy that would simultaneously create massive credit and consumerism? To function properly, the market would have to speculate the decisions of these people, who were trying to speculate the market. There's your excess speculation, which doesn't happen with sound money.
Rothbard gives a lengthy and powerful description of the Austrian Theory of the Business Cycle, which Hayek would eventually win a Nobel Prize for. Also, Higgs shows how the depression could have been considered to last until 1946, if you don't believe that military production bought with debt indicates a good economy. Keynesian and military-keynesian approaches to solving depressions took almost 20 years to fix after an inflationary boom of 8 years.
I recommend this book to anyone interested in a mixture of government policy and the economics behind the Great Depression. It contains well-written arguments and factual numbers to support them. It is not hard to read, although it will read easier if you know a thing or two about economics. Rothbard shines in being able to speak in clear and simple terms while delivering powerful arguments that anyone should be able to grasp.
I do not recommend this book to anyone who is dead-set upon socialism or fascism; however, if you haven't heard of the Austrian Business Cycle Theory to explain the Great Depression, you cannot be dead-set upon those principles. Take the time to read this book. Rational debate requires complete knowledge of opposition viewpoints.
I would supplement this book with other literature from Mises, as well as study the financial situation of Japan in the 90's.
25 of 70 people found the following review helpful:
Summary: Economics is not a fact-free science
Date: 2008-05-12 - 
Comment: Murray Rothbard's book, America's Great Depression, is really two books in one. One is a very bad book. It purports to use economic tools to explain how the Great Depression came to be. The other is a potentially very good book. What is suggests is that Herbert Hoover, although well intended, engineered a bad situation into a catastrophe. Overall, I do not recommend the book to the general public as having a good explanation of why events of the 1920s led to the Great Depression, nor would I recommend it to the general public as an exemplar of good economic thinking. But I do recommend it to my fellow economists as an exemplar of how not to do economics.
The bad book occupies the introductions to each of Rothbard's five editions of the book (the last published posthumously, and with an introduction by Paul Johnson), and then the first six chapters. From those introductions, it is apparent that Rothbard was a follower of Ludwig von Mises' Austrian school of economic "thinking," a school that apparently believes, economics can be a fact-free science. That can be seen in Rothbard's Introduction to the First Edition where he wrote (xxxix f.): "... I make no pretense of using the historical facts to "test" the theory. On the contrary, I contend that economic theories cannot be 'tested' by historical or statistical fact. ... The only test of a theory is the correctness of the premises and the logical chain of reasoning." If that is indeed the Misesian-school's thinking, I question what kind of theory and what kind of economics can be produced by its fact-free science. Unlike Athena and Zeus, truth cannot spring from von Mises' head unvarnished by observation, and it cannot do so from anyone else's head for that matter. After all, how did von Mises first get to the theory he proposed, and Rothbard used, without actually having observed facts on the ground. In the end, truth needs recourse to facts and observations, and to refutable hypotheses. It is the scientist's task to tease the evidence, or lack thereof, from recalcitrant facts and observations for the hypothesis or theory being proposed. Absent that, all one is left with is fact-free science, which is no science at all. It is simply assertion papered over by an ideological just-so story. In that regard, the Misesian-school appears to be no better than the Marxian school (although ideologically, the polar opposite). If Rothbard represented the Misesian-school accurately, I would dismiss that school's approach as being theory without measurement, in the same way, as in my graduate days, that we dismissed measurement without theory.
To show how misleading fact-free science can be, I recall a famous story about Albert Einstein and quantum mechanics. Einstein, using a thought experiment in 1935 (the so-called EPR paradox) had proposed a seemingly irrefutable test about particles in quantum mechanics. The paradox was impossible to test with the equipment available at the time, and so stood for quite a while. Only in the 1970s and later, with the advent of high-energy cyclotrons, did the paradox become testable and indeed was refuted.
Of course, Rothbard's book is not entirely fact-free. He did use some historical facts to 'test' the theory, or at a minimum, to demonstrate its validity. He did that despite his contention that economic theories cannot be "tested" by historical or statistical fact. I find the difference between what he said he would not do and what he did to be most puzzling.
Rothbard's book, in its first part, contains much that was ill defined, seemingly inconsistently defined, or downright misleading. Also, there seems to have been too narrow a focus on component parts, coupled with a unwillingness to look at larger and possibly more pertinent aggregates. The book has other areas of confusion as well, but those are of less import, and I will skip them in the interest of brevity.
In Chapter 1 of the book, we come across the first of Rothbard's confusing and ill-defined terms. It is in the context of the hypothesis he sets as to the economic theory behind what caused the Great Depression. According to Rothbard, the hypothesis depends on von Mises' view that bank credit expansion will lead to a series of investment errors that turn out to be "malinvestment in higher-orders of production." One can ask, what are "higher-order of production"? Rothbard definition was: investment in capital-goods "most remote from the consumer"(10). What does that mean? Can one consider investment in farmland, a form of capital, as investment in a higher-order of production, insofar as farmland can be pretty remote from the consumer? I doubt that is what Rothbard had in mind. The next question is, what is "malinvestment," and how does it lead to a downturn in the economy? As to the question's first part, what is the definition of malinvestment, frankly, it was never clear to me, being based on the already ill-defined notion of "higher-orders of production." As to the question's second part, Rothbard's reasoning there seems to fail his "logical chain of reasoning." Rothbard's reasoning was that the decline in demand for higher-orders of production is accompanied by an increase in demand for lower-orders of production (whatever that means) and that is what leads to an economic downturn. But that is not logical. When one component of demand is increasing while another is decreasing, why should demand in the aggregate decline? Only a decline in aggregate demand will lead to an overall decline in profits and employment. Otherwise, all we are talking about is a change in the composition of demand, not a change in its total. Rothbard's focus on that component of demand he called, "malinvestment," to the exclusion of other components does not logically explain why the total should decline. If the Misesian hypothesis is that a single component's decline reduces total demand, the burden of proof is on Rothbard, or members of the Misesian-school, to provide first, a tight definitions of terms and then observable evidence to support the hypothesis. Otherwise, all they have done is engage in just-so fables.
Another definition Rothbard used, one that I think is highly misleading, was his definition of "inflation." When I first skimmed through the book, I thought Rothbard had used it as it has been historically used, to mean price inflation. So, I then wondered, what inflation was he talking about? That's because the 1920s was a period of mild deflation in most prices, except for farm land prices, which declined significantly, and for stock prices, which increased significantly. Only upon reading the book carefully did I discover the peculiar meaning Rothbard attached to the term, "inflation." It can be found on p. 12, n.8: " 'Inflation' is here defined as an increase in the money supply not consisting of an increase in the money metal." So, any increase in non-metallic money was for Rothbard, by definition, "inflation." (Some of the reviewers, I observed, do not seem to have noticed Rothbard's odd definition of the term.) Rothbard's terminology was and is downright confusing. The term, inflation, first came into use in the US in the late 1830s when it meant what it means today. (The precise definition is in: Online Etymology Dictionary, © 2001 Douglas Harper: "Monetary sense of, enlargement of prices - originally by an increase in the amount of money in circulation.") In contemporary terminology, it means an increase in the price of good in services. In the 1920s and 1930s, it seemed to have meant an increase in stock prices. (See Amity Shlaes' The Forgotten Man, p. 4.) No twentieth-century economist I know of has ever used the term as Rothbard did.
The meaning Rothbard assigned to the term "inflation" may have in part stemmed from the Misesian thought that bank credit expansion leads to business cycles. But I think the primary reason he used the term was his animus to fractional-reserve banking in general, and to central banks in particular. Specifically, Rothbard saw fractional-reserve banking as being "fraudulent" (25). He would have had the government outlaw fractional-reserve banking by imposing 100% gold reserves on deposits. I find it odd that Rothbard, who professed to be a libertarian, saw no contradiction here between his recommending the use of the heavy-hand of the government to override the people's own decision-making and his own libertarian principles. What I have to conclude is that he viewed depositors as incapable of making decisions in their own best interests. Of course, one can ask, why stop with having government imposing its will in this area? Go the whole hog and become a true Marxist. Have government impose its will in all areas by making all the decisions for the public. I, though, take the opposite view. People have to be considered as capable of making their own decisions and as having responsibility for them. In the field of banking, depositors have to be considered as knowing what's going on, and as being willing participants in fractional-reserve banking. That's because they benefit immensely from fractional reserve banking, with the primary benefit being the reduction in the costs of holding and using money. As a contrafactual, suppose depositors don't want to use fractional-reserve banking. They could always hold cash balances in a vault in their homes or offices or factories. For transactions needing checks, they could go to the bank for cashiers' checks. All that, though, is expensive and inconvenient, which is why depositors use banks whose reserves are just a fraction of deposits. I would also have to conclude here that, not only was Rothbard apparently an ideologue, he was an elitist. Because he thought he knew better, he wanted to make people toe the line for what is good for them. Again, that is not very different from Marxism wherein the leaders supposedly know just the right kind of goods and services to produce for the people (who, though, never seem to concur).
Chapter 4, titled, "The Inflationary Factors," is the heart of the bad part of the book. Rothbard opened the chapter by describing what he thought would happen in the absence of fractional-reserve banking. Specifically, he said (86): "For a hallmark of the inflationary boom is that prices are higher than they would have been in a free and unhampered market." (He of course revealed there that he misunderstood the difference between the level, and the rate of increase of prices. Interpreting a free and unhampered market to mean a market with 100 percent gold reserves for deposits, prices would indeed be higher with fractional-reserve banking, but in an inflationary boom - meaning one where the money supply increases rapidly and relative to gold reserves - prices would not only be higher, they would be increasing faster than they otherwise would have.) But even before the advent of the US current central bank, the Federal Reserve, there never was a period in US history without fractional-reserve banking and with the market being totally free and unhampered. Below I will compare the period 1899-1912, when the market was more free and less hampered, with the period of the 1920s. That is because the first period was prior to the Federal Reserve's establishment, and the second was afterwards when the market was, supposedly, less free and more hampered.
The inflation (of the money supply) of the 1920s on which Rothbard dwelled can be found in Table 1 of chapter 4 (p. 92). To measure inflation of the money supply, Rothbard used a very broad definition of money that included life insurance net policy reserves. While I have seen many definitions of money, I have never seen one like that. Of course, one is free to use any definition one wants, but it has to be grounded in some observable relationship. But Rothbard's approach, that hypotheses and definitions "cannot be 'tested' by historical or statistical fact," precluded his doing so. If we stick with the usual definitions of money for that period, either M2 or M2 + S&L deposits, we find that the money supply grew respectively by 45 to 43 percent in the 1920s. (Rothbard's inclusion of life insurance net policy reserves and S&L capital rather than deposits, increases that number to about 63 percent.) Of course, one could ask, what was the increase in the period 1899-1912, prior to the Federal Reserve's establishment? The respective increases turn out to be, 149 and 132 percent. At a compound annual rate, the numbers for the 1920s are respectively, 4.5 and 4.8 percent, while for the period 1899-1912, they are, respectively, 7.3 and 6.7 percent. (For consistency, I would have compared Rothbard's definition that included life insurance but I did not have data on life insurance for the earlier period; also, again, for purposes of consistency, the data I used were from Table A-1 pp. 704-711 of Friedman and Schwartz's, A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960.) Clearly, there is nothing outlandishly large about the money supply growth of the 1920s to get very exercised about. Again Rothbard's narrow focus on a particular datum for a short period turns out, on the surface, not to have any explanatory power.
In both periods, one contributing factor to money supply growth was that both banks and depositors chose to increase the ratio of deposits to reserve money each held (currency plus bank reserves, also called, high-powered money or the monetary base). The difference in the two periods is that reserve money grew more rapidly in the first period than in the second period. In the first period, reserve money grew at a 4.8% annual compound rate while in the second period, it grew at a compound annual rate of slightly more than 1%. Not surprisingly, prices in the first period rose faster in than in the 1920s. (Specifically, from 1899 to 1912 wholesale prices rose 32 percent while from 1921 through 1929 they fell 2.5%!) What we see here is that the 1920s, being less free and more hampered can, sometimes bring about a modest deflation compared to a period that was more free and less hampered. One can see what happens when fact-free science comes to face to face with pesky little facts.
If chapter 4 is the heart of the bad book, Table 7 on p. 109 is the heart of chapter 4. It was from the data in that table, that Rothbard argued (108): "...the inflation [in money] was clearly precipitated deliberately by the Federal Reserve. The plea that the 1920s was simply a 'gold inflation' that the Federal Reserve did not counter actively is finally exploded." His reasoning was that "controlled reserves increased by $1.79 billion for the entire period and that exceeded the monetary gold stock's increase of $1 billion." The problematic aspect with the 'controlled reserves' in Table 7 is that Rothbard's never provided a definition for controlled reserves. While he did provide some computations pertinent to controlled reserves on p. 113, when those computations are applied consistently throughout Table 7, the figures do not add to the amounts he termed there, controlled reserves.
Another way of looking at what Rothbard was describing can be found Chart 25 on p. 282 of Friedman and Schwartz's Monetary History. The chart demonstrates the opposite of Rothbard's claim. It makes it quite clear that what the Fed was attempting to do was to use Federal Reserve credit to offset changes in monetary gold stocks that were occurring at the time. Based on the modest growth of reserve money, we would have to say they were somewhat successful.
Another problematic aspect raised by Table 7 is its narrow focus on reserves held at the Federal Reserve by banks that are members of the Federal Reserve system. He did not account for the vault cash of the members or the reserves of the non-members. By focusing just on those reserves, he gave a skewed accounting of the increase in bank reserves. By Rothbard's accounting, reserves increased by 47.5 percent from June 1921 through June 1929. (See his Table 6, 102.) When all bank reserves are taken into account, though, the increase comes to 27.5%; and when all reserve money is taken into account, the increase is just 8.4 percent. (See, respectively, Table A-2, 738f., and Table B-3, 802f., of the Monetary History.) Again Rothbard's focus on a specific component, rather than on the total, presents results that can be viewed as misleading.
A slightly different explanation of what happened is that individuals had a greater preference for bank money than currency in the 1920s, and so they converted their currency into bank money. Comparably, the banks had a greater preference for reserves at the Federal Reserve then they did for vault cash, so they, in effect, transferred any new funds received from the public into reserves at the Federal Reserve. The increase, than, in reserves held at the Federal Reserve was not so much an increase engendered by the Federal Reserve, but simply the workings of banks and depositors preferring one form of money to another.
After chapter 6, we enter into Rothbard's discussion of Hoover's actions. Although he did occasionally discuss actions by the Federal Reserve in those chapters, his primary focus was on Hoover. This part of the book is potentially very good. It provided me with a good deal more insight into what could have made the Great Depression, great. Unfortunately, Rothbard, in accordance with his school's thinking, did not do a full analysis of Hoover. More statistical work would have been necessary, and that is why this part remains only potentially very good.
Rothbard's description of Hoover painted him as an interventionist, a Roosevelt-lite character. According to Rothbard, Hoover attempted to prevent prices and wages from falling. When demand declines, though, both attempts are futile and just stave off the day of reckoning. Hoover may have been partially successful in preventing prices from falling far enough and fast enough. From 1929 to 1933, wholesale prices fell by about 25%. By comparison, in the previous recession in 1920, wholesale prices fell by 37% in the course of one year. Hoover's success on keeping wages from declining is less clear (especially because good wage indexes do not exist for that time). From 1929 to 1933, average hourly earnings in all industries fell by 25% while in the two years from 1920 to 1922 they fell by 15%. For both periods, the compound annual decline is amazingly close, about 7% per year. Hoover's intentions may have been noble, but all he did was to engineer the economy so it could not adjust to the decline in demand
What about the Smoot-Hawley tariff, which many today blame for the Great Depression? The ostensible reason for the tariff was to help farmers, but if US imports are reduced, it becomes harder for farmers to sell products overseas. (Foreign importers won't have the foreign exchange available to buy the farm products.) Rothbard thought it contributed mightily to the Depression. His evidence was the opposition of almost all the economists and the fact that the market broke after the tariff was signed into law (241f.). That though does not constitute evidence. The market's having sunk is by itself not evidence. The old saw of, correlation is not causation is at work here. The fact that many economists opposed the tariff is also not evidence. Indeed, Rothbard did not accept stable prices as being a beneficial goal of monetary policy despite many economists having recommended it as policy. Moreover, there was an earlier tariff, the Fordney-McCumber Tariff, which went into effect in 1922, and was just as onerous as Smoot-Hawley. Yet, it seems not to have caused any lasting real effects. Rothbard, without having done any of the heavy lifting with regard to analyzing the costs of the Smoot-Hawley, then stated (241)" ... it was at a precarious time of depression that the Hoover administration chose to hobble international trade, injure the American consumer, and cripple the American farmers' export markets by raising tariffs higher than their already high levels." This is economics by assertion. It proves nothing.
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